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Abstract 
The valence illusion hypothesis is developed and states that valence acts as superordinate 
dimension in impression formation. Valence biases the judgment of perceived characteristics of 
other human beings. Evaluative Conditioning (EC) is a procedure to isolate and manipulate 
valence directly and was used in seven experiments to produce desired valence effects. Three 
experiments were devoted to the question whether EC procedures can account for valence effects 
in impression formation. Photographs of persons were conditioned with either positive or 
negative valence. Altering the photographed persons slightly (e.g., adding glasses) after the 
conditioning phase simulated everyday change in appearance of human beings. Four additional 
experiments investigated the proposed role of valence in impression formation. In the evaluative 
rating phase, participants were asked to rate the portrayed persons on a total of ten different 
characteristics, all of them belonging to the big two of impression formation, agency and 
communion. Evaluative Conditioning affected valence ratings on altered photographs, and 
valence did influence the perceived characteristics of photographed human individuals on all 
tested characteristics. Furthermore, the size of the valence effect can be predicted by the 
conceptual similarity of one characteristics to likability. Implications and avenues of future 
research are discussed. 
  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Framework der Valenz Illusion wird erarbeitet und stellt die Hypothese auf, dass 
Valenz eine übergeordnete Dimension im Bereich der Eindrucksbildung darstellt. Valenz führt zu 
einer verzerrten Bewertung von Eigenschaften anderer Menschen. Evaluatives Konditionieren ist 
eine Prozedur um Valenz zu isolieren und zu manipulieren und kam zu diesem Zweck in sieben 
Experimenten zum Einsatz. Drei Experimente haben dabei untersucht ob Evaluatives 
Konditionieren dazu geeignet ist, Valenz-Effekte in der Eindrucksbildung von Personen erklären 
zu können. Portrait-Fotografien von Personen wurden mit entweder positiven oder negativen 
Stimuli gepaart, wobei Veränderungen in den Stimuli Änderungen von Personen im Alltag 
simulieren sollten (z.B. das Tragen oder Weglassen von Brillen). Vier weitere Experimente haben 
die postulierte Rolle von Valenz als übergeordneter Dimension in der Eindrucksbildung 
untersucht. Nach der Konditionierungsphase wurden die Probanden gebeten die portraitierten 
Personen auf insgesamt 10 unterschiedlichen Eigenschaften zu bewerten. Evaluatives 
Konditionieren beeinflusste die Bewertung für alle 10 Eigenschaften. Die Größe dieses Valenz-
Effektes kann durch die konzeptionelle Ähnlichkeit einer Eigenschaft zur Eigenschaft 
„Sympathie“ vorhergesagt werden. Implikationen und Hinweise für weiterführende Forschung 
werden diskutiert.  
  
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 8 
1.1  Impression formation .......................................................................................... 8 
1.2 Accuracy in impression formation ...................................................................... 9 
1.3 Possible structures underlying impression formation ....................................... 10 
1.4 Valence and the Big Two ...................................................................................11 
1.5 Cognitive illusions ............................................................................................ 12 
1.6 Evaluative Conditioning ................................................................................... 16 
1.7 The valence illusion hypothesis ........................................................................ 17 
1.8 The current investigation .................................................................................. 19 
2. Experiments 1a - 1c ................................................................................................. 21 
2.1 Prior research. ................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Experiment 1a ................................................................................................... 22 
2.2.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.2 Results ........................................................................................................... 25 
2.2.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 26 
2.3 Experiment 1b ................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.2 Results. .......................................................................................................... 27 
2.3.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 27 
2.4 Experiment 1c ................................................................................................... 28 
2.4.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 28 
2.4.2 Results. .......................................................................................................... 29 
2.4.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 30 
2.5 General discussion Experiments 1a - 1c ....................................................... 30 
3. Experiments 2a - 2d ................................................................................................ 32 
3.1 Experiment 2a ................................................................................................... 32 
3.1.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 33 
3.1.2 Results. .......................................................................................................... 34 
3.1.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 35 
3.2 Experiment 2b ................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.2 Results. .......................................................................................................... 36 
 
 
3.2.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 37 
3.3 Experiment 2c ................................................................................................... 38 
3.3.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 38 
3.3.2 Results. .......................................................................................................... 39 
3.3.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 39 
3.4 Experiment 2d ................................................................................................... 40 
3.4.1 Method. ......................................................................................................... 40 
3.4.2 Results. .......................................................................................................... 41 
3.4.3 Discussion. .................................................................................................... 43 
4. General Discussion .................................................................................................. 44 
4.1  Putting the valence illusion into context ........................................................... 44 
4.2  The role of correct recognitions ........................................................................ 46 
4.3 Implications....................................................................................................... 46 
4.4 Future research. ................................................................................................. 47 
4.5 Limitations ........................................................................................................ 48 
4.6 Conclusion. ....................................................................................................... 48 
 
References ......................................................................................................................... 50 
List of figures .................................................................................................................... 58 
List of tables ...................................................................................................................... 58 
List of abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 58 
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................... 59 
Appendix B ....................................................................................................................... 65 
Appendix C ....................................................................................................................... 66 
 
 
8 
 
1. Introduction 
The first chapter aims to give the reader a broader perspective on the rich literature on 
research of related concepts. This comprehensive overview leads then to the reasoning of my 
specific hypothesis that was investigated thoroughly, namely the valence illusion hypothesis. In 
order to do so, I will briefly summarize past research on forming impressions, Cognitive 
Illusions and Evaluative Conditioning. Afterwards, I will lead into my specific hypothesis and 
describe every conducted experiment in great detail. This dissertation will end by discussing the 
results thoroughly and putting them into the context of the existing literature.  
The chapters on impression formation are largely inspired by Uleman’s and Kressel’s 
(2013) excellent summary of the history of theory and research on impression formation. I do not 
want to take any credit for the large amount of work they were putting into identifying and 
putting together all the work researchers have done in the past 100 years. Instead, the goal of 
these chapters was to select the pieces that are related to my very own research question in order 
to give the reader a better understanding of how my research question fits into the large body of 
already existing research. The same is true for the chapters on Cognitive Illusions, which are 
inspired by the book Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and 
memory (Pohl, 2017). The evidence reported for Evaluative Conditioning is largely inspired by a 
meta-analysis conducted by Hofman, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, and Crombez (2010). 
 
1.1  Impression formation 
In order to survive, people need to judge their environment carefully, and one aspect of 
the environment are other people. Who is this other person? Does he or she want to harm me, or 
do me good? And does he or she have the abilities to do so?  
Unsurprisingly, the research on how we form our impressions of other people has a long 
tradition, and some of the most known advancements in psychological research stem from this 
area.  
The terms impression formation or person perception refers to processes by which 
individual pieces of information are used to form a global impression of the target person. Maybe 
the biggest problem that has plagued researchers from all over the world is the problem of 
accuracy in impression formation. Which piece of information leads to an accurate description of 
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one’s personality, and which leads to a bias?  And is there such thing as an objective way of 
describing one’s personality? 
 
1.2 Accuracy in impression formation 
As will be seen, people’s perception of others can be very diverse. While one can 
describe a stone objectively (e.g., color, weight), there is no objective standard for impressions 
people leave on others. In fact, what we see in others depends largely on assumptions and 
feelings (e.g., Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzales, 2008).  
Uleman and Kressel (2013) gave an excellent summary of the history of theory and 
research on impression formation: In the earlier years of the 20th century, the measurement of 
subjective phenomena such as impression formation began to make progress. While Likert 
(1932) introduced his scaling, Thurstone (1928) published the method of paired comparisons for 
measuring attitudes. These and other related methods allowed researchers to observe subjective 
phenomena in a quantitative manner, increasing the acceptance of such research. Asch (1946) 
focus on traits enabled him to identify two central traits that are often used up to this day (warm, 
cold) when a person’s personality should be described. He showed participants fictional target 
people with lists of traits and asked the participants to form an impression. He found that out of 
all tested traits, warm and cold were the traits that had the biggest influence on participants 
freshly formed global impression. Luchins (1948) criticized Asch’s (1946) experiments, arguing 
that these artificially achieved effects “may achieve experimental neatness” (p. 325), but would 
only do so by neglecting important factors that contribute to the impression formation in a real-
world context (e.g., individual and situational contexts). In 1955, Cronbach published his classic 
critique on accuracy research in impression formation, demonstrating that many of previously 
reported findings may be nothing more than statistical artifacts. Because his methodological 
concerns were so fundamental, research on accuracy in impression formation disappeared until 
1987, when Kenny and Albright revived it. By summarizing the difference between subject and 
object perception, Kenny described the root of the problem that plagued the research on accuracy 
in impression formation quite well: “First, person perception is two-sided: Each person is both 
perceiver and target. Second, …. perceivers attempt to read the minds of targets and engage in 
what is called ´meta-perception`. Third, … there is a close linkage between self- and other 
10 
 
perception. Fourth, … people, unlike objects, change when they are with different interaction 
partners” (Kenny, 1994, quoted in Uleman & Kressel, 2013).”  
As can be seen, accuracy in research on impression formation is hard to achieve, even in 
laboratory settings.  
 
1.3 Possible structures underlying impression formation 
Besides the problems of accuracy, researchers wanted to find out possible structures and 
processes underlying impression formation. A prominent approach are associative memory 
networks, an idea borrowed from cognitive psychologists (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973). In 
associative memory networks, mental structures are described as nodes, connected to each other 
by links that transfer activation or inhibition. Nodes become linked to each other when they are 
activated together (contiguity). Therefore, nodes that were linked together by activation form a 
structure of associated concepts. Bruner (1957) described how activation increases a concept’s 
accessibility. Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) published their classic studies of the fictional 
Donald. Participants were first primed with a concept (reckless versus adventurous) and then 
shown an ambiguous description of a fictional person called Donald. After this procedure, 
participants were more likely to describe Donald in the direction of the primed trait. The 
frequency and the recency of the use of a concept both increases the accessibility of the concept 
(Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985). 
In a different line of research, Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968) were also 
concerned with the structure underlying trait impressions, which led to implicit personality 
theories (e.g., Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972), and extracted two main dimensions, similar to Asch`s 
(1946) warmth and cold dimensions. Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, and Kashima (2005) 
labeled the warmth and competence dimensions identified by Rosenberg et al. (1968) as the “Big 
Two”, because they build the foundation of many theories on impression formation, for example 
the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) or its elaboration, the 
behaviors form intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) map. 
Even though the label of the Big Two can vary from one line of research to another, they are very 
similar in their conceptualization. The warmth dimension (often labeled as communion) 
describes how warm, friendly and well-intentioned one person is, while the cold dimension 
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(often labeled as agency) describes how dominant, potent, and influential the person is (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Abele & Wojciszke, 2014).  
   
1.4 Valence and the Big Two 
Approximately in 1980 social cognition had emerged as a “new” approach to social 
psychology, and it highlighted research on understanding processes rather than only outcomes. 
Among other things, the focus on processes gave valence a headline on the front page of 
impression formation. In Anderson’s (1965, 1974) information integration, weighted averaging 
model, evaluative dimensions that described a target were averaged in order to predict an overall 
impression. A typical finding of this is that negative traits were given more weight in the average 
by participants than positive traits. Skowronski and Carlston (1989) explained these findings in 
their category diagnosticity approach. They argue that cues such as traits have more weight if 
they offer a better diagnostic of the to be judged dimension. They define diagnosticity as the 
reduction of uncertainty in choosing among responses. Building on the arguments of Reeder and 
Brewer (1979), they added that the diagnosticity depends on the domain. A good (versus bad) 
performance (positive valence) might be more diagnostic for the domain of abilities, because 
everyone can have a bad day. Immoral behavior (negative valence), on the other hand, may be 
more diagnostic then moral behavior for the domain of morality, because, so the reasoning, even 
evil people might act good sometimes. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs (2001) 
and Rozin and Royzman (2001) simultaneously showed that negative events have more weight 
than positive events in many ways. They concluded that negative events are more potent then 
equally positive events. The negativity increases more rapidly in space and time, they dominate 
positive information when integrated, and they are more differentiated and complex (Unkelbach, 
Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008).  
Positive and negative valence are not only weighted differently, there are also differences 
in the processing of the information. Pratto and John (1991) demonstrated that negative 
information leads to higher incidental memory and attracts attention automatically more than 
positive information. Abele and Bruckmueller (2011) showed that communal traits (similar to 
warmth) were recognized faster than agentic traits (similar to competence) in a lexical decision 
task and were faster categorized by valence. This is in line with De Bruin and Van Lange’s 
(2000) finding that people find communal (versus agentic) information as being more diagnostic 
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when they want to learn something about a potential future interaction partner, and they also did 
spend more time reading the communal information. 
As a short summary, people need to judge their social environment, but accuracy in these 
judgments is hard to achieve. Nevertheless, two main dimensions have been identified, agency 
and communion. Valence seems to play a significant role in these judgments, but the focus of 
past research has been on valence differences for positive and negative valence. The causal effect 
of valence itself has not yet been the target of investigations in impression formation research. 
 
1.5 Cognitive illusions 
When accuracy is hard to achieve, errors will be made. In fact, humans continuously 
make errors when it comes to thinking, judgments and/or memory. There are many phenomena 
that show that subjective memory, thinking, and judgment differ from objective measures. As an 
analogy to the better-known field of “optical illusions”, the term “cognitive illusions” has been 
used to describe a certain set of human errors (Roediger, 1996).  
Pohl (2017) identified five points to distinguish cognitive illusions from other forms of 
typical errors: First and most importantly, illusions lead to a perception, judgment, or memory 
that reliably deviates from an objective reality. For optical illusions, subjective perceptions and 
objective stimuli can be compared, and thus, the illusion can be easily measured. Unfortunately, 
this is much harder to do in the domains of thinking and judgment. The problem lies in the 
definition of what “correct” thinking or judgment is (Gigerenzer, 1996). Second, this described 
deviation from reality must be a deviation in a systematic rather than in a random fashion. Third, 
cognitive illusions appear involuntarily, meaning that they will appear spontaneously and without 
any instructions or deliberate will. This does not exclude any motivational factors as they do 
moderate the size of cognitive illusions, but they are not the ultimate cause of it (Pohl, Bender, & 
Lachmann, 2002). Illusioned people often do not realize that they have been blinded by an 
illusion (Gigerenzer, 1996). The fourth point to distinguish cognitive illusions from other errors 
is that the illusion is hard if not impossible to avoid. By manipulating instructions, material, 
and/or other procedural variations, some researchers have reduced or even eliminated some 
cognitive illusions (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Sedlmeier, 2008), but for other 
illusions these attempts have failed (e.g., Pohl & Hell, 1996).    
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As the fifth and last point cognitive illusions do stick out as something special and rather 
distinct from the normal course of information processing. Cognitive illusions pique our 
curiosity (Roediger, 1996) by seeming to be somewhat different, and thus, motivates us to 
explain these unexpected but robust findings.  
As described earlier, the term cognitive illusions relates to certain errors in the domains 
of memory, thinking, and judgment. 
Memory illusions are typically errors in the recall or recognition of earlier presented 
material. One famous case is the so-called hindsight bias, which describes a tendency in which 
people exaggerate what they knew in foresight. For example, after knowing the result of a 
basketball match, people were too convinced that they would have predicted the winning team 
beforehand (Pezzo, 2003). 
Illusions of thinking are those errors that are made when certain rules have to be applied 
(e.g., falsification principle, logic). These results can be derived from normative models and their 
results can serve as a benchmark against which human performance is evaluated. One common 
illusion of thinking is the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). It occurs when people overestimate 
the amount of control they have over an outcome. Thompson and colleagues (2004), for 
example, showed participants either a red “O” or a green “X”. They were told that they could 
choose to press or not to press the space bar in order to get the green “X”. Even though the 
software was programmed in such a way that pressing or not the space bar had zero effect on the 
occurrence of the desired letter, participants were still convinced they had control over the 
outcome. 
The third category of cognitive illusions are illusions of judgment. In many experimental 
settings, the participants task is to subjectively rate a specific aspect of a given stimulus (e.g., 
liking). In some cases, other aspects inside of the experimental setting may bias participants 
judgment in a systematic fashion, for example a neutral stimulus might be perceived as more 
pleasant to the eye when presented simultaneously with a pleasant melody. It is important to note 
that these judgments have to be made under uncertainty, meaning that participants can rely on 
subjective impressions, only (Pohl, 2017). Illusions of judgment include well known phenomena 
such as the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974) or the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 
1968).  
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Maybe the most interesting illusion of judgment, concerning the current investigation, is 
the halo effect (Thorndike, 1920). The halo effect is a cognitive bias that describes a tendency of 
judges to assume that once a person possesses some known good (or bad) characteristics, their 
other, unrelated and unknown characteristics are also likely to be consistent, that is, good or bad 
(Forgas & Laham, 2017). One of the most prominent halo effects can be observed when 
participants are asked to judge certain characteristics of physically (un)attractive people. Even 
though participants were not given any direct information about any sort of character traits, 
participants are likely to believe that physically attractive persons possess more positive 
character traits then physically unattractive persons. This tendency is often labeled as what-is-
beautiful-is-good (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 
1991). Negative halo effects do also exist and are often termed the devil effect or the horns 
effect, in which a single negative attribute can lead to a negative bias on unrelated other 
characteristics. Conceptually, these halo effects are similar to other kinds of constructive 
cognitive illusions characterized by a general confirmation bias (Forgas & Laham, 2017). Halo 
effects are known to influence a wide range of social judgments but are mostly studied in the 
domain of impression formation. 
In their classic experiment, Dion and colleagues (1972) gave participants a set of 
photographs showing young women, which were classified beforehand as attractive, average, or 
unattractive. Participants task then was to rate these women on a wide range of characteristics. It 
is interesting to note that this task is somewhat unfair, because there was no information about 
their personalities given. Participants, however, performed the task regardless, and they could 
only do so by relying on the physical appearance showed on a photograph. As a result, 
participants rated the attractive women as having better personalities, to be happier, and more 
likely to marry. As a little surprise, the average looking women were rated as more competent 
parents. This outcome was commonly interpreted as a demonstration, that halo effects do not 
spread to any given attribute equally but is moderated by the content of the to be judged 
dimension.  
These halo effects do not only appear in the laboratory, but have consequences in the real 
world, because once an initial expectation about a person is formed, they can become self-
perpetuating with consequences about how a person is treated (Harari & McDavid, 1973). Landy 
and Sigall (1974) reported that the same essay would be rated more positively when the writer is 
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an attractive rather than an unattractive woman, and this effect was even stronger for bad (versus 
good) essays. Dion (1972) found evidence that unattractive children were more held responsible 
for breaking rules then attractive children, and that these rule breaking is perceived as being 
more likely to happen again when the child is unattractive. In the same vein, Efran (1974) asked 
participants to play the role of members of a university disciplinary court. Their task was to 
judge about another student’s possible misconduct, such as cheating in an exam. The judges were 
less likely to believe that the student was guilty and awarded less severe punishment when the 
defendant was good looking.   
Halo effects are not limited to the original target but may transfer to related persons. 
Sigall and Landy (1973) showed that when participants were shown a beautiful woman, they 
formed more positive impressions about her male partner. Wilson (1968) found that information 
about the academic status of a previously unknown guest lecturer influenced the ratings of guest 
lectures physical height. Even though participants had the opportunity to see and thus actually 
judge the physical height of the guest lecturer, they still judged him to be taller when the 
previously given information included high academic status rather than low academic status. 
Watkins and Johnston (2000) showed that attractive people are more likely to be hired, and when 
they are, they also are more likely to be paid more (Hammermesh & Biddle, 1993). 
Important boundary conditions that limit the generalizability do exist. As mentioned 
earlier, in Dion and colleagues (1972) classic experiment, the what-is-beautiful-is-good effect did 
not spread equally to every given dimension but seemed to be moderated by the content of the to 
be judged dimension. Eagly et al. (1991) confirmed this findings with a meta-analytical 
approach: The strongest halo effects were found for ratings of social competence, followed by 
intellectual competence, while ratings of concerns for others and integrity produced the smallest 
halo effects. Sigall and Ostrove (1975) reported evidence that the what-is-beautiful-is-good 
effect does not always help the attractive person. In their study, they found that attractive persons 
were awarded more severe punishment when the attractiveness itself was used to commit a 
crime, such as swindling. Forgas (2011) reasoned that the induction of negative mood can 
possibly eliminate halo effects, because negative mood has shown to recruit a more analytical, 
systematic and externally focused processing strategy.  
To summarize, halo effects are a cognitive illusion in impression formation in which 
perceivers make unwarranted inferences about qualities of a person based on unrelated 
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information that was given about that person. Most importantly, these spread over effects seem to 
appear always in the same valent direction. Even though the content of the judged dimension 
matters, it seems that positive information always leads to positive evaluations on related 
dimensions (halo effect) while negative information always leads to negative evaluations on 
related dimensions (the devils effect or the horn effect). This, however, has not been tested 
systematically, yet. 
 
1.6 Evaluative Conditioning 
As described earlier, valence is a significant player in two linked domains of 
psychological research, impression formation and cognitive illusions. But how can subjects 
acquire valence in the first place? One possible procedure is called Evaluative Conditioning 
(EC). EC may be best described as an effect that is attributed to a particular core procedure. 
Specifically, EC refers to a change in the valence of a stimulus (the effect) that is caused by the 
pairing of that stimulus with another positive or negative stimulus (the procedure) (De Houwer, 
2007). The first stimulus is often labeled as the conditioned stimulus (CS), and the second 
stimulus as unconditioned stimulus (US). A typical outcome would be that the CS becomes more 
positive when it has been paired with a positive US, and more negative when it has been paired 
with a negative stimulus. Let’s illustrate this with a quick example. Imagine you do like George 
Clooney. Imagine further how you walk into a kitchen, and you see George Clooney standing 
right in front of you. But not only is he standing there, he is also holding a cup of coffee in his 
hands and smiles at you. Unfortunately, George Clooney has to walk out of the scene of our little 
imagined story now, leaving only you and the cup of coffee in the kitchen. As a result of this 
encounter, you will be likely to like this cup of coffee a little bit more than you would if you 
would not have seen George Clooney holding it. To go back to the definition of EC, George 
Clooney served in this example as the US (positive valence), and he was paired with a CS (cup 
of coffee). Because both the CS and the US have been presented together, our mind associated 
the CS with the US, and thus the valence of the US transferred over to the CS. And that is how 
the little cup of coffee acquired some positive valence.  
Modern EC experiments are mostly inspired by Levey and Martin (1975). They 
introduced the so-called picture-picture paradigm, which is still frequently used by EC 
researchers. In the standard picture-picture paradigm, neutral pictures serve as CSs and valent 
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pictures serve as USs. In the conditioning phase, the CSs will be presented together with the 
USs. In the subsequent rating phase, participants are asked to rate the CSs in terms of likability. 
The result then is, just as described above, that the CSs that were presented together with positive 
USs were liked more than the CSs that were presented together with negative USs. 
EC effects are very robust and well documented (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). They have been observed in many areas of psychological research, 
for example in learning psychology (e.g., Martin & Levey, 1978), social psychology (e.g., Olson 
& Fazio, 2001; Walther 2002), consumer science (e.g., Allen & Janiszewski, 1989), emotion 
research (e.g., Mallan & Lipp, 2007), neuroscience (e.g., Coppens et al., 2006), nutrition science 
(e.g., Bernstein & Webster, 1980), clinical psychology (e.g., Hermans et al., 2004) and even in 
relationship science (McNulty, Olson, Jones, & Acosta, 2017).  
Even though EC has been present in variety of domains, the main focus of EC researchers 
has been on the questions of whether EC is a unique form of Pavlovian conditioning and what 
are the processes that underlie EC. While research on EC is steadily progressing, the answer to 
both questions is still under huge debate (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010), and beyond the scope of 
the current investigation. 
 
1.7 The valence illusion hypothesis 
In the last paragraphs, I outlined the role of valence in impression formation, and in 
cognitive illusions. I also outlined how valence can be acquired in the first place. In this 
paragraph, I want to describe how these pieces may fit together and result in, what I call The 
Valence Illusion.  
Valence has been the subject of many studies in impression formation, but in these, it has 
never been manipulated directly. In the studies of halo effects for example, it has been shown 
that the knowledge about a known characteristic influences the judgment of unknown 
characteristic of the same person, and it does so in the same valent direction. If you think that 
George Clooney is beautiful, the what-is-beautiful-is-good effect would predict that you are also 
likely to think that George Clooney is intelligent. But what happens if you do not know any 
concrete characteristic of a person (not even his or her physical appearance), but would only 
know the associated valence? While it is hard to think of a real-life example in which this exact 
setting applies, the isolation of valence without any confounds might very well offer some 
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important insights in everyday human behavior. How much are our actions and feelings 
influenced just by pure valence? It is easy to think that we like a person because he or she is very 
warm and honest. In this case, the characteristics of a person influences our liking. But what if 
we think that a person is warm and honest, just because we associate positive valence with him 
or her? This would be what I call the valence illusion.  
Let’s start with some working definitions that are necessary. In the present investigation, 
valence will be understood as a latent construct that describes either positivity or negativity. 
While this definition may be arguable, it can be derived from past research. EC, as one example, 
is defined as a change in valence of a former neutral stimulus due to the pairing with a valent 
stimulus. But because valence is a latent construct and thus difficult to measure directly, the 
standard measure of such a valence change in EC research is likability, the one characteristic that 
might come closest to valence. If something is positive, it seems reasonable to assume that we 
will like it. So, while valence will be defined as a latent construct that cannot be measured 
directly, likability will be understood as the characteristic that is conceptually closest. It does 
serve as a proxy but is not 100% identical with valence itself. 
Grounding on these assumptions, the valence illusion hypothesis states that valence may 
act as a superordinate dimension in impression formation. As a superordinate dimension, it 
should influence subordinate dimensions. Because I described valence as either “positivity” or 
“negativity” (a mix of positivity and negativity would be ambivalence, while the absence of 
valence would be neutral), I predict that subordinate dimensions to valence would be dimensions 
that can be described as either positive or negative. To add some examples, most people would 
certainly agree that honesty is good and lying is bad. So, the valence illusion hypothesis is crystal 
clear in its prediction: If valence does in fact act as a superordinate dimension, it should affect 
the judgment of human beings in a systematic fashion. In this case, individuals loaded with 
positive valence should be judged as more honest then individuals loaded with negative valence.  
Finally, I call it a valence illusion, because the influence of valence manifests itself as a 
cognitive bias, and not as a correct observation of the to be judged characteristic. When we 
believe that person a is more intelligent than person b, only because person a was loaded with 
positive valence and person b with negative, then this believe is clearly illusional.  
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1.8 The current investigation  
The topic of the current investigation is to explore possible valence effects on impression 
formation. To do so, it was hypothesized that valence acts as superordinate dimension, and this 
superordinate dimension affects subordinate dimensions which leads to a cognitive bias.   
In order to test these assumptions carefully, two distinct experimental sets were 
administered. The first set was devoted to the question on how valence can be isolated and 
manipulated directly, in a way, that is suitable for the investigation of possible valence effects in 
impression formation.  
The second set of experiments was administered to test the far-reaching claim of the 
valence illusion hypothesis, namely, that valence will influence our judgment on all perceived 
abilities of human beings when the characteristics in question can be described as either positive 
or negative.  
EC is a procedure that has been used to transfer valence from one stimulus to another. 
Thus, it seemed to be a perfect fit for the demands of the present investigation. While EC has 
produced manifold valence effects when photographs of human beings have been served as CSs 
(e.g., Hütter et al., 2014), it is still an open question whether these valence transfers only affect 
the very specific stimulus in the experimental setting (e.g., only the very specific photograph of a 
person, and not the person itself), or whether they spread over to other instances of CSs (e.g., the 
whole person that was being photographed). For EC to be a plausible explanation for valence 
effects in real world phenomena, it has to be the case that the valence effects do occur on CSs, 
even when they are altered in some way. For example, human beings change their appearance 
regularly, they wear different clothes on different days, change the way their hairs are cut or 
decide to wear glasses from one day to another. The first set of experiments were designed to test 
this assumption. A standard EC picture/picture paradigm was set up with pictures of human 
beings serving as CSs. These photographed human beings were then changed in their 
appearance, simulating every day changes in real life. I assume that people have to identify the 
human beings that were paired with valenced stimuli before, because otherwise, people might 
think that this altered photograph represents a different person. If people do believe that the 
altered version represents a different person, then I assume that the valence acquired in the 
conditioning phase does not transfer over to them.  
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The same standard EC procedures was administered once again, in the second set of 
experiments. In this, the CSs were not altered anymore after the conditioning phase. However, in 
the classic way of running an EC procedure, participants will only be asked how much they like 
the portrayed person. To test the valence illusion hypothesis, nine more characteristics 
(belonging to the big two) were added in the evaluative rating phase, to check whether the 
pairings affected characteristics beyond likability.  
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2. Experiments 1a - 1c 
The first set of experiments were concerned with the question the generalizability of EC 
effects. For EC to be a reasonable procedure for the investigation of valence effects in 
impression formation, EC effects must transfer over to other instances of the specific CSs used in 
the conditioning phase. It is not enough that EC procedures cause a change liking of conditioned 
photographs, by doing so, it must change the liking of the photographed person itself. 
Experiments 1a - 1c tested whether this is the case by altering the used CSs after the conditioning 
phase. If not only the specific stimulus acquires valence in EC procedures, but the whole identity 
of a stimulus, then EC would be a perfect fit for the investigation of the valence illusion 
hypothesis.   
 
2.1 Prior research. 
While this question has not been tackled directly by past research, some experiments 
came close. One of these experiments was published by Walther (2002). She conducted a set of 
experiments in which participants were presented photographs of individuals, which served as 
CSs. In a standard EC procedure, these photographs were then paired with valent stimuli (USs). 
Before the conditioning procedure, however, participants learned about some associations the 
portrayed persons have, for example a friend. Importantly, these pre-associates have never been 
paired with any valent material. As a result, she found the standard EC effect, in which the paired 
persons acquired the valence of the US. More interestingly, the pre-associates also acquainted the 
same valence. Walther (2002) demonstrated that the EC effect may not be limited to the specific 
stimulus that has been paired, but can affect associated stimuli, as well. Hütter, Kutzner, and 
Fiedler (2014) showed it is possible to not only condition the identity of a stimulus, but to 
condition specific cues, as well. They paired CSs that shared a unique cue (whereas a cue 
represents a category such as gender or age; in this example male gender) with mostly positive 
USs. A small portion of male CSs were paired negatively. They found that positively paired CSs 
were evaluated more positively, but even CSs that were paired negatively were evaluated 
positively, if they shared the same positive cue (in this case male gender). Again, the EC effect 
did not only show on the specific CS that had been paired positively or negatively, but on CSs 
that were associated with now valent CSs (in this case cues).  
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In a very recent set of studies, McNulty et al. (2017) asked married couples to view a 
stream of images of their partners, which then were paired with either positive or neutral images. 
Participants that were shown their partners pictures coupled with positive images showed more 
positive automatic partner attitudes than participants that were shown their partners with only 
neutral stimuli. In a sense, these results show that EC effects can transfer over to judgments 
about the real person. 
Maybe the most direct approach to the question whether the EC procedure affects only a 
specific photograph of a person, or other instances of that person was done by Unkelbach, Stahl, 
and Förderer (2012). They used computer-generated male faces as CSs in a standard EC 
procedure. After the conditioning phase, participants were then presented these computer-
generated faces in four conditions (unchanged, with added beard, with added glasses, and with 
added beard and glasses). Surprisingly, they failed to observe an EC effect in the changed 
conditions. When they artificially added a beard and/or glasses, the effect evaporated. These 
(non-)findings are contrary to what the existing literature suggest, and thus need to be examined 
further. One possible explanation for the non-findings would be that participants did not believe 
that the altered animated photographs represented the already presented animated individuals, 
but represented, instead, new identities. 
 
2.2 Experiment 1a 
Experiment 1a1 aimed to demonstrate that the procedure of EC does not only affect the 
specific CSs, but other instances of that CSs, as well. We hypothesized that because in real world 
settings, most stimuli will change slightly in appearance, but will still be recognized as the same 
stimuli that has been seen before. This is especially true for human beings. When meeting person 
a at time x, he or she might wear different clothes, glasses or may even have a different haircut 
then when meeting the same person, a at time y. Still, most people will able to identify person a, 
regardless of the change in appearance. Hence, people should be able to identify the correct 
person in an EC paradigm, even when the stimuli serving as CSs are changed slightly in 
appearance. For Experiment 1a, we used photographs of human beings as CSs. These 
                                                 
 
1 Daniel Nils Tönsing wrote his bachelor’s thesis about Experiment 1a in 2015. 
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photographs were taken as a full-frontal shot. After the conditioning phase, the conditioned 
photographs were presented, but this time the angle of the photograph changed (VAC, viewing 
angle change). Hence, the specific stimuli were changed slightly in appearance, but the identity 
of the photographed persons remained the same. We expected an EC effect to occur, even on the 
altered CSs. 
 
2.2.1 Method. 
Participants and Design. 64 students (30 female, 33 male, 1 unspecified) from the University of 
Tübingen, Germany, with a mean age of 22.94 years (SD = 3.01, range 19 – 30 years) 
participated in this study. They were either compensated with monetary payments (2.50 Euro) or 
course credit. The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (change of perspective: 0° 
vs. 45° vs. 90°) within-subjects design with repeated measures. Additionally, correct recognition 
of used CSs was measured.  
Materials and Procedure. The first experiment is described in greater detail than the subsequent 
ones, which follow the same general procedure. Participants were greeted by either a male or a 
female experimenter and seated in front of a computer screen. Every participant was seated in a 
separate room. The experiment consisted of three phases, which were administered entirely by a 
computer program: the conditioning phase, the evaluative rating phase, and the recognition 
phase. The instructions informed participants that it was their task to observe a stream of pictures 
on the computer screen. The size of the monitor was 19 inches and the resolution was 1920 x 
1080 pixels. In the conditioning phase, 12 portrait photographs (6 female, 6 male) from the 
Radboud Faces Database (RaFD; Langer, Dotsch, Bijlstra, Wigboldus, Hawk, & Knippenberg, 
2010) served as CSs and had a size of 384 x 577 pixels. In a pretest, the six male portrait photos 
and the six female portrait photos did not differ in likeability, t(57) = 0.19, p = .857. 96 (48 
positive, 48 negative) pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) served as USs. The size of the USs was 472 x 472 pixels. The USs 
did differ in terms of valence, t(96) = 11.82, p < .001, meaning that positive pictures were indeed 
rated as more positive than negative pictures. CSs were randomly assigned to US valence for 
each participant. CSs and USs were placed in the center of the screen, while the position of the 
CSs and USs (left vs. right) rotated. Each CS was paired 8 times with positive (negative) USs for 
a total of 96 CS-US pairings. Every CS-US pair was presented for 3 seconds, the interstimulus 
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interval (ISI) was set to 500 ms.  In the conditioning phase, all portrait photographs were a full-
frontal shot. In the evaluative rating phase, participants were presented the same portrayed 
persons (CSs) used in the conditioning phase and asked to rate them on how much they would 
like the portrayed person, on a scale ranging from -50 (not at all) to 50 (very much)2. To do so, 
participants were presented a continuous slider, where the negative value was always on the left 
side and the positive value always on the right side. In this rating phase, however, the same 
portrayed persons were not only presented in a full-frontal photograph, but in a photograph 
showing them from a 45° and a 90° viewing angle, respectively. The direction in which the 
person seems to look (left or right) was set to 50% each. In the recognition phase, 12 (6 female, 6 
male) more portrait photos were taken from the same database (RaFD) to serve as distractors and 
were added randomly in the mix. Viewing angles of the distractors were balanced, as well. For 
the recognition test, participants were simply asked whether they have seen the portrayed person 
before in this experiment or not (Answers: yes vs. no). This was done to check whether the 
possible EC effect occurred only for those portrayed persons that were in fact conditioned with 
valence. 
 
     
Figure 1. Example CS in different viewing angles. 1. Full-frontal, 2. 45° VAC with left orientation, 3. 45° VAC 
with right orientation, 4. 90° VAC with left orientation, and 5. 90° VAC with right orientation. 
 
Data preparation and analysis. For all reported experiments, multilevel model analyses were 
calculated for all dependent measures to assess relationships on a trial-by-trial basis (Judd, 
Westfall, & Kenny, 2012)3. All models contained random intercepts for participants and items, 
                                                 
 
2 Exact wordings of all tested items throughout this dissertation are given in Appendix B 
3 The code is given in Appendix C 
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which were fully crossed by design. The effects of our hypothesized predictors were always 
fixed, and the full hypothesized models will always be reported.  For all multilevel model 
analyses, effect coding was used (for a discussion of effect coding vs. dummy coding, see 
Kugler, Trail, Dziak, & Collins, 2012). US valence was always coded as -1 for negative valance 
and 1 for positive valence. The potential moderation of US valence effects by viewing angle 
change was tested by contrasts, meaning that the levels of viewing angle change (VAC) were 
tested against the baseline condition (no change in the viewing angles of CSs after the 
conditioning phase). The evaluative ratings were always based on a post-post analysis (difference 
of positively and negatively paired CSs after the conditioning phase) which can be considered as 
the superior control group in comparison to a pre-post analysis (difference of pre-ratings before 
and post-ratings after the conditioning phase) in that it also controls for mere exposure 
(Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). The recognition ratings were 
always standardized. For a better readability, only p-values of non-significant results were 
reported in the results section. Full statistics are given in Appendix A.  
 
2.2.2 Results 
Recognition rates (RR). Overall, participants recalled 94.35% of used CSs correctly. In the 
unchanged condition, 96.12% of used CSs were recalled correctly, in the 45° change condition 
95.30% of used CSs were recalled correctly and in the 90° change condition 91.18% of used CSs 
were recalled correctly. Participants identified the correct persons, even when the viewing angle 
was changed.  
Evaluative ratings. US valence was a significant predictor of CS likeability, b = 4.73, se = 1.11, t 
= 4.27, p < .001, indicating that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more positively than 
CSs paired with negative USs. There was no effect for VAC of 45° (p = .82). There was a 
marginal effect for VAC of 90°, b = 2.96, se = 1.57, p = .06, indicating that CSs were evaluated 
more positively when the viewing angle of the portrayed person was changed by 90°. RR did not 
predict CS likeability (p = .48). The effect for US valence was not moderated by VAC, neither by 
45° change (p = .63), nor by 90° change (p = .16), indicating that the effect of US valence did not 
differ depending on the levels of VAC. RR did not interact with any predictor (all ps > .18). 
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2.2.3 Discussion. 
 Participants rated portrait photographs more positively when they were paired with 
positive USs than CSs that were paired with negative USs, demonstrating the standard EC effect. 
Interestingly, this effect was independent from VAC.  
As predicted, the EC effect did occur, even when the CSs were altered. However, it was 
hypothesized that this effect should have only occurred for those CSs that were correctly 
remembered. There are two possible reasons for this (non-)finding. First, participants were able 
to correctly identify more than 94% of presented photographs. This means that it is possible that 
there has been too little variance in this measure. Second, in the literature, there is evidence for 
EC effects even when participants do not recall the used stimuli correctly (e.g., Hütter, Sweldens, 
Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012). 
 
2.3 Experiment 1b 
Experiment 1b was designed to replicate the main finding of Experiment 1a. We expected 
the EC effect to occur once again, regardless of any VAC. Because of the very high correct RR, I 
doubled the amount of CSs and distractors to make the recognition task a little bit more difficult. 
To fully maximize the randomization procedure for presenting stimuli, this time the photographs 
in the conditioning phase were taken in different viewing angles, as well. 
 
2.3.1 Method. 
Participants and design. 64 Students (44 female, 20 male) students of the University of 
Tübingen, Germany, participated in this study. The mean age was 27.22 years (SD = 11.12, 
ranging from 18 to 63 years). They were either compensated with monetary payments (2.50 
Euro) or course credit. The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (change of 
perspective: 0° vs. 45° vs. 90°) within-subjects design. Additionally, recognition of used CSs was 
measured. 
Materials and procedure.  Materials and procedure were the same as used in Experiment 1a, 
with the following exceptions: The amount of CSs was doubled to 24 portrait photos (12 female, 
12 male). Complementary, the number of distractors were doubled to the same amount (24; 12 
female, 12 male). Both, the CSs and the distractors were taken from of the RaFD database. While 
in experiment 1 CSs in the conditioning phase were always presented from a frontal view, in 
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experiment 2 they were randomly presented from either a frontal perspective or from a 90° 
viewing angle. In the rating phase, the change in the viewing angle was measured (change of 0°, 
change of 45° and change of 90°). While in Experiment 1 the recognition task was always 
presented after the evaluative ratings, this time 50% of participants were asked to perform the 
test before the evaluative ratings. 
 
2.3.2 Results.  
Recognition rates. Overall, participants recalled 72.98% of used CSs correctly. In the unchanged 
condition, 80.86% of used CSs were recalled correctly, in the 45° Change condition 64.84% of 
used CSs were recalled correctly and in the 90° Change condition 73.24% of used CSs were 
recalled correctly. Again, participants identified the correct persons, even when the viewing 
angle was changed, but did so to a lesser degree than in experiment 1a.  
Evaluative ratings. US valence was a marginal significant predictor of CS likeability, b = 1.46, 
se = .76, t = 1.91, p = .056, indicating that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more 
positively than CSs paired with negative USs. There was a marginal significant effect for VAC of 
45°, b = 1.80, se = 1.08, t = 1.66, p = .098, indicating that CSs that were presented in a 45°-
degree change were evaluated more positively, regardless of US valence. There was no 
significant effect for VAC of 90° (p = .66). RR was a significant predictor for CS likeability, b = 
2.44, se = .87, t = 2.80, p < .01, indicating that CSs that were correctly recognized were 
evaluated more positively than CSs that were not recognized.  The effect for US valence was not 
moderated by VAC, neither by 45° change (p = .74), nor by 90° change (p = .66), indicating that 
the effect of US valence did not differ depending on the levels of VAC. RR did not interact with 
any predictor (all ps > .10). 
 
2.3.3 Discussion. 
Experiment 1b was designed as a replication of experiment 1a with a more sophisticated 
design. The results of experiment 1b confirmed the general findings of experiment 1a, with some 
differences. First, as intended, participants recognized the correct CSs to a lesser degree. Second, 
the standard EC effect did show, but was only marginally significant. As in experiment 1a, the 
relationship of US valence and CS ratings was independent of any VAC. Again, the correct 
recognition of a formerly presented CS did not moderate any effect. Because the recognition test 
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was more difficult this time, there was more variance in this measure, but the hypothesized effect 
was not found. These results may again support the notion of contingency unaware EC.  
Lastly, participants rated correct recognized CSs as more favorable then unrecognized CSs. One 
potential explanation for this unexpected finding could be the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 
1968), in which repeated exposure to a stimulus could potentially result in a greater liking for 
that stimulus. 
 
2.4 Experiment 1c 
The third experiment aimed to simulate a more realistic scenario for everyday change in 
the appearance of human individuals. The whole set of experiments 1a - 1c was designed to 
answer the question whether EC procedures are a plausible explanation for the acquaintance of 
valence effects in person perception in the real word. The most likely way a person’s appearance 
changes from time x to time y may lie in fashion choices. For this reason, the change in 
appearance was manipulated by adding (or subtracting) glasses to the photographed persons. 
This manipulation has two main advantages. First, it simulated everyday change in appearance in 
the real world, and second, it allows for a direct comparison with Unkelbach and colleagues 
(2012) non-finding. While Unkelbach et al. (2012) used artificial faces in their experiments, this 
experiment is done with real photographs of persons, and the glasses were added by a 
professional designer. 
 
2.4.1 Method. 
Participants and design.  80 students (62 female, 18 male) of the University of Tübingen, 
Germany, participated in this study. The mean age was 22.03 years (SD = 6.32, ranging from 18 
to 65 years). They were either compensated with monetary payments (2.50 Euro) or course 
credit. The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (change of CS feature: glasses vs. 
no change of CS feature: glasses) within-subjects design.  
 
Materials and procedure. In Experiment 1c, the same basic EC procedure was used. This time, 
however, the change of the CS features was manipulated by presenting portrait photos of the 
same person either with or without glasses. Two versions (with and without glasses) of 16 
different portrait photographs (8 female, 8 male) served as CSs (resulting in a total of 32 CSs). 
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Additionally, two versions (with and without glasses) of 16 different portrait photographs (8 
female, 8 male) served as distractors in the recognition test. Both versions (with or without 
glasses) appeared in the conditioning phase as well as in the evaluative rating phase. The 
likeability scale for the evaluative rating ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much), the 
recognition test was the same as in Experiment 1a and 1b. 
    
Figure 2. Example CSs with and without glasses.  
 
2.4.2 Results. 
Recognition rates. Overall, participants recalled 81.48% of used CSs correctly. In the unchanged 
condition, 87.34% of used CSs were recalled correctly, in the change condition 75.63% of used 
CSs were recalled correctly. Participants were able to identify the correct person to a large 
degree, even when glasses were added (or subtracted).  
Evaluative ratings. Across conditions, US valence was a significant predictor of CS likeability, b 
= 3.15, se = 0.97, t = 3.25, p < .01, indicating that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more 
positively than CSs paired with negative USs. The change of the CS feature was no significant 
predictor of CS likeability (p = .91), and more importantly, change of CS feature did not 
moderate the effect of US valence (p = .71). The recognition ratings were no significant predictor 
for CS likeability (p = .30). There was a marginal significant interaction of US valence and 
correct recognition of the CSs, b = 1.75, se = 1.03, t = 1.70, p = .09, indicating that the found EC 
effect might only be true for those CSs participants recalled correctly (regardless or the CS 
feature change). There was no other significant interaction (all ps > .41). 
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2.4.3 Discussion. 
Experiment 1c confirmed that EC effects do occur for altered stimuli. This time, EC 
effects were found for persons, regardless of them adding or subtracting glasses after the 
conditioning phase. This time, however, the hypothesized influence of correct recognized 
individuals did moderate the EC effect, even though only marginally significant.  
These results make it likely that EC procedures can account for valence effects in real 
world person perception, the main question that was investigated in this first experimental series. 
Experiment 1c suggests that the correct identification of the conditioned stimuli may play a 
significant role, after all. This result, however, stays in contrast to the findings of Experiment 1a 
and 1b.  
These results do also stay in contrast with the (non-)findings of Unkelbach et al. (2012), 
who did not find a spread over EC effect on altered CSs by employing a very similar experiment. 
The main difference between experiment 1c and the one Unkelbach and colleagues (2012) 
administered lies in the choice of stimuli. While Unkelbach et al. (2012) used completely 
artificial faces, we used real photographs. The use of artificial portraits may have confused 
participants. It is thinkable that they did not encode the changed faces as belonging to the same 
artificial person presented earlier, but instead, may represent a new identity. 
 
2.5 General discussion Experiments 1a - 1c 
Experiments 1a - 1c suggests that EC is a reasonable procedure to produce valence 
effects in impression formation. Participants were presented photographs of individuals, and 
these photographs were paired with either positive or negative valence. Afterwards, participants 
liked positively paired photographs more than negatively paired photographs. Most importantly, 
the change in liking did not only occur for the specific photographs used in the conditioning 
phase, but generalized to photographs showing the same, but altered individual. In Experiment 
1a and 1b, these alterations were administered by changing the angle in which the individual was 
photographed, in experiment 1c the individuals were altered by added (subtracted) glasses to 
simulate alterations that are common in real life encounters with human beings.  
These findings are important for the explanatory power of EC. Valence effects produced 
by EC procedures in the lab would be of very little explanatory power if only the very specific 
stimulus that was used would profit from the pairings. The results show, however, that this is not 
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the case. Valence effects produced by EC procedures do generalize over to altered versions of the 
presented stimulus. It was hypothesized that this generalization should only occur for altered 
stimuli participants correctly identify as belonging to the same identity of the previously seen 
stimuli. To investigate whether this is the case, participants were asked to identify previously 
seen individuals as being part of earlier phases of the experiment. The results have been mixed 
and do not allow for a conclusive interpretation. While in Experiments 1a and 1b the correct 
identification did not moderate the valence effect, in Experiment 1c it did (but only marginally). 
A possible explanation for found generalizations of valence effects even on those altered stimuli 
that were not correctly identified is contingency unaware EC, but future research needs to 
address this question in greater detail. 
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3. Experiments 2a - 2d 
After demonstrating that EC procedures are a reasonable tool to investigate valence 
effects on impression formation, the second set of experiments was devoted to the question 
which dimensions are affected by valence manipulations, and most importantly, why.  
As noted earlier, the hypothesized valence illusion predicts that valence should influence 
all dimensions that can be described as either positive or negative. In the history of research on 
impression formation, characteristics that belong to the big two, agency and communion, have 
emerged as the center dimensions when describing other persons. It has also been shown that 
valence seems to play a role in these judgments, for example in halo effects.  
We predict that valence acts as a superordinate dimension that influences subordinate 
dimensions, which are all dimensions that can be described as either positive or negative. Thus, 
the first three experiments of the second set of experiments are devoted to the question whether 
valence does in fact influence other dimensions in the hypothesized way. To test this, ten 
characteristics that belong to either agentic or communal traits served as dependent variables, 
because all of them can be described as either positive or negative. In the last experiment, the 
exact relationship of valence and the tested characteristics was the main source of interest. 
 
3.1 Experiment 2a  
The first experiment of the second set aimed to gather first evidence that valence affects 
other characteristics beyond likability. Likability is the classic dependent variable used in EC 
paradigms to measure the change in valence. Halo effects suggest that in impression formation, 
one known characteristic can influence the judgment about other, unknown characteristics of one 
person, and it seems do so in the same valence. But what happens if no concrete characteristic is 
known, but only the valence associated with a person?  
In past research, agency and communion have emerged as the big two dimensions of 
impression formation, so they seemed to be a reasonable choice do serve as dependent variables. 
Past research suggests that halo effects occur for unknown, but related characteristics. For 
example, when it is known that person a is intelligent, people would also believe that he or she 
might be very productive, because both characteristics, intelligence and being productive, belong 
to agentic traits.  
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We hypothesized that valence might act as a superordinate dimension in impression 
formation, and that it should influence all dimensions that can be described as either positive or 
negative. If that is true, we expected valence to affect both, agentic and communal related 
characteristics, because of all them can be described as positive or negative. To test this 
hypothesis, Experiment 2a administered a standard EC picture/picture paradigm. As in these 
standard paradigms, likability served as a dependent variable. Additionally, nine more 
characteristics that belong to either agency or communion were tested. 
 
3.1.1 Method. 
Participants and design. 36 students of the University of Tübingen, Germany, participated in 
this study.4 They were either compensated with monetary payments (2.50 Euro) or course credit. 
The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 10 (characteristics) within-subjects design. 
 
Materials and procedure. The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1a, but without 
altering the CSs afterwards. This time, 16 naturalistic portrait photographs (8 female, 8 male) 
served as CSs and were taken from Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach and Klauer (2012). USs 
were the same as in Experiments 1a and 1b. It is noteworthy that selected USs did not contain 
any pictures of human beings to avoid any possible interferences. After the conditioning phase, 
participants were asked to rate the portrayed persons on ten different characteristics, always on a 
scale ranging from -50 to 50 (e.g., “How intelligent is this person?”). Five of these characteristics 
were agency related (competency, efficiency, full of energy, intelligence, respectability) and five 
communion related (fairness, honesty, likability, loyalty, sincerity). Because likability does not 
only belong to communion related characteristics, but is also the standard measure of EC effects, 
it also serves as a manipulation check.  
 
                                                 
 
4 Due to an error in the computer program, age and sex of participants were not saved. Because the 
recruitment process was identical to the other reported experiments, a similar representation is likely. 
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3.1.2 Results. 
As can be seen in Table 1, US valence was a significant predictor for all ten tested 
characteristics, meaning that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more positively than CSs 
paired with negative USs, regardless of the specific attribute.  
 
Table 1 
Results of Experiment 2a 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and type of characteristics on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Agency and communion. To investigate whether the effect of US valence was moderated by the 
type of characteristics (agency or communion), an additional multilevel model analysis was 
conducted, and effect coding was used. Agency related characteristics were coded as -1, while 
Communion related characteristics were coded as 1. US valence was a significant predictor for 
CS overall ratings, b = 3.54, se = 0.69, t = 5.12, p < .001, indicating that CSs paired with positive 
USs were rated more positively across all evaluative ratings than CSs paired with negative USs. 
Type of characteristics was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = -3.40, se = 0.98, t = 
-3.49, p < .001, indicating that CSs received higher scores on agency related characteristics than 
on communion related characteristics. These main effects were, however, qualified by an 
interaction of US valence and type of characteristics, b = 3.25, se = 0.98, t = 3.33, p < .001, 
Attribute b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 4.95 0.82 6.06 < .001 
Efficiency 2.05 0.76 2.72 < .01 
Full of energy 4.48 0.86 5.22 < .001 
Intelligence 2.39 0.71 3.37 < .001 
Respectability 3.74 0.83 4.50 <. 001 
     
Communion     
Fairness 6.74 0.81 8.30 < .001 
Honesty 7.16 0.87 8.27 < .001 
Likability 6.76 0.90 7.48 < .001 
Loyalty 6.87 0.87 7.89 < .001 
Sincerity 6.56 0.82 7.99 < .001 
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indicating that the effect of US valence was stronger for communion related characteristics than 
for agency related characteristics. 
 
3.1.3 Discussion. 
The valence illusion hypothesis predicted that valence acts as a superordinate dimension 
in impression formation, and thus should influence all dimensions that can be described as either 
positive or negative. The results of experiment 2a strongly supported this hypothesis. All ten 
tested characteristics were influenced by valence, and the influence was always in line with US 
valence, meaning that a positively paired person was rated as more positive on every tested 
characteristic in contrast to negatively paired persons.  
Interestingly, the relationship of valence and characteristic was moderated by the type of 
characteristic. Characteristics belonging to the dimension of communion were affected more 
strongly by valence than characteristics belonging to the dimension of agency. Even though not 
directly predicted, it may still support the reasoning of the valence illusion hypothesis. That is 
because likability is used as the standard measure of valence effects in EC procedures (e.g., 
Hofman et al., 2010), it can be argued that likability may be the closest characteristic to the latent 
variable valence. If that is the case, the results suggest that the perceived distance from one 
characteristic to the latent variable valence might predict the size of the valence effect on that 
characteristic. From an evolutionary perspective, communal characteristics might be more 
diagnostic than agentic characteristics. That is because it may be more important for surviving to 
identify the intentions of unknown people first, and judging their abilities to carry out these 
intentions second (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011) 
On a procedural level, the selection of USs was taken with care. For example, all pictures 
containing any human being were sorted out beforehand to rule out any possible interference 
with perceived characteristics of shown human beings. However, the USs did contain living 
creatures and nature. One possible alternative explanation might be that the USs possibly 
contained, for some reasons, pictures that, for the participants, did relate more to communal 
characteristics like warmth, than agentic characteristics like being productive. Experiment 2a 
cannot rule out such a critique. 
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3.2 Experiment 2b 
Experiment 2b served two main purposes. First, it aimed to replicate the findings of 
experiment 2a. Once again, valence should influence all given characteristics. Second, 
experiment 2b was designed to eliminate the possible alternative explanation in that not valence 
directly might have caused the effects, but the pictures served as USs did maybe contain more 
information than just pure valence. For this reason, the pictures serving as USs were replaced by 
the written words “positive” and “negative”. This way, any significant difference can be 
attributed directly to pure valence. 
 
3.2.1 Method. 
Participants and design. 35 students (27 female, 8 male) of the University of Tübingen, 
Germany, participated in this study. The mean age was 22.94 years (SD = 3.67, ranging from 19 
to 34 years. They were either compensated with monetary payments (2.50 Euro) or course credit. 
The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 10 (Characteristics) within-subjects design.  
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 2b is complete replication of Experiment 2a, with one 
significant exception: The pictures served as USs in experiment 2a contained animals and/or 
pictures of natural environments. In this experiment, the written words positive (positive 
valence) and negative (negative valence) replaced the pictures as serving USs. Everything else 
was held constant to Experiment 2a. 
 
3.2.2 Results. 
As shown in Table 2, Experiment 2b replicated the main findings of Experiment 2a. Four 
Agency related attributes and four Communion related attributes were influenced by US valence. 
The tests for full of energy (Agency) and loyalty (Communion) failed to reach significance. 
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Table 2 
Results of Experiment 2b 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and type of characteristics on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Agency and communion. US valence was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = 1.99, 
se = 0.61, t = 3.28, p < .01, indicating that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more 
positively across all evaluative ratings than CSs paired with negative USs. Type of characteristics 
was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = -3.03, se = 0.86, t = -3.53, p < .001, 
indicating that CSs received higher scores on Agency related characteristics than on Communion 
related characteristics. There was no significant interaction of US valence and type of 
characteristics (p = .98), indicating that there was no difference in the effect of US valence on 
Agency- or Communion-related characteristics. 
 
3.2.3 Discussion. 
Experiment 2b replicated the main finding of experiment 2a: Valence did influence all ten 
tested characteristics, as predicted by the valence illusion hypothesis. This time, however, 
communal characteristics were not affected stronger by valence than agentic characteristics.  
The results add further support to the idea that valence acts as a superordinate dimension in 
impression formation by replicating these findings in another independent experiment. The 
results did not support any idea of communal characteristics being influenced more by valence 
Attribute b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 2.28 0.70 3.27 < .01 
Efficiency 1.84 0.67 2.74 < .01 
Full of energy 1.41 0.80 1.75 .08 
Intelligence 1.87 0.65 2.87 < .01 
Respectability 2.21 0.70 3.15 <. 01 
     
Communion     
Fairness 3.24 0.75 4.33 < .001 
Honesty 2.63 0.77 3.41 < .001 
Likability 1.77 0.83 2.12 < .05 
Loyalty 1.05 0.78 1.35 .18 
Sincerity 1.75 0.76 2.29 < .05 
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than agentic characteristics that were brought up in the aftermath of experiment 2a. Because of 
the conflicting results on this issue, it remains an open question whether valence does influence 
different characteristics with different effect sizes. 
 
3.3 Experiment 2c 
Experiment 2c aimed to shed light on the nature of the conflicting findings of 
experiments 2a and 2b. In both experiments, valence did influence all characteristics, regardless 
of them belonging to the agentic or communal dimension. In experiment 2a, communal 
characteristics were affected more strongly than their agentic counterparts. In experiment 2b, this 
distinction was absent. These conflicting results were observed in two nearly identical 
experimental settings, with the only difference being pictures or words serving as USs. The 
nature of this relationship is nonetheless of theoretical importance. If communal characteristics 
do get affected more strongly by valence than agentic characteristics, this would give us some 
insights to possible underlying processes, as mentioned in the aftermath of experiment 2a. Thus, 
experiment 2c was set up to replicate both, experiment 2a and 2b, in one experiment, treating the 
different USs as an experimental factor. First of all, this allows to test whether the difference 
between the two experiments holds true in a replication, and secondly, it allows for a direct test 
of the size of the valence effect caused by the different types of USs. 
 
3.3.1 Method. 
Participants and design. 77 students (58 female, 19 male) of the University of Tübingen, 
Germany, participated in this study. The mean age was 23.45 years (SD = 4.44, ranging from 18 
to 52 years). They were either compensated with monetary payments (2.50 Euro) or course 
credit. The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Type of characteristics: Agency 
vs. Communion) X 2 (US material: pictures vs. words) mixed design with repeated measures on 
the first two factors. The factor US material was manipulated between subjects.  
Materials and procedure. Experiment 2c is a combined replication of experiments 2a and 2b, 
treating the difference of both experiments (US stimuli) as an experimental factor. Everything 
was identical to both previous experiments. The assignment to the two experimental groups was 
completely random. 
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3.3.2 Results. 
Because experiment 2c was designed to test the effect of US material on the interaction of 
type of characteristics, only the grand analysis will be reported.5 Agency and Communion. US 
valence was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = 3.18, se = 0.33, t = 9.67, p < .001, 
indicating that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more positively on both, agency- and 
communion-related characteristics than CSs paired with negative USs. Type of characteristics 
was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = -1.43, se = 0.33, t = -4.35, p < .001, 
indicating that CSs received higher scores on agency related characteristics than on communion 
related characteristics. There was a significant interaction of US valence and type of 
characteristics, b = 1.16, se = 0.33, t = 3.54, p < .001, indicating that the effect of US valence 
was stronger for communion related characteristics than for agency related characteristics. There 
was a marginal significant interaction of US valence and type of US material, b = -0.60, se = 
0.33, t = -1.82, p = .07, indicating that the effect of US valence was stronger in the 
picture/picture paradigm than in the picture/word paradigm. However, the interaction of US 
valence and type of characteristics did not depend on US material (p = .17). 
 
3.3.3 Discussion. 
The results of experiment 2c confirmed, once again, the valence illusion hypothesis. 
Valence did influence all tested items that can be described as either positive or negative. Most 
interestingly, the relationship of valence and tested characteristic was moderated by the type of 
characteristics: The results mirrored the pattern of Experiment 2a in which communal 
characteristics were influenced even more by valence than agentic characteristics. Additionally, 
valent pictures had a stronger influence than valent words overall, meaning that the valence 
manipulation was more potent with pictures rather than words.   
These results suggest that it is reasonable to hypothesize that valence does have a 
significantly different impact on different characteristics. At the same time, the results further 
highlight the important question on why this is the case.   
 
                                                 
 
5 A multilevel model analysis on each individual perceived characteristic revealed the same pattern of 
results as reported in experiments 2a and 2b. Full results are given in Appendix A.  
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3.4 Experiment 2d 
Experiment 2d was administered to investigate the question why certain characteristics 
are more influenced by valence manipulations than others. It confirmed that characteristics 
related to the communal dimension were more heavily affected by valence than their agentic 
counterparts.  
One reason might be that likability, the standard measure of valence effects in EC, may 
be the one characteristic that is conceptually closest to the latent variable of interest, valence. If 
that is the case, then the perceived distance from any given characteristic towards likability 
should predict the size of the valence effect. One way of testing the distance between two 
cognitive concepts is multidimensional scaling. The Spatial Arrangement Method (SpAM; Hout, 
Goldinger, & Ferguson, 2013) is a tool to collect similarity data for items in a multi-dimensional 
space. It is built upon the assumption that people can reliably and validly sort attitude objects in a 
way that more similar attitude objects are located more closely to another. It has been shown to 
be as effective as traditional methods to collect similarity data for multidimensional scaling but is 
more efficient when dealing with more attitude objects at once. The method has been 
successfully used with agency and communion items before (e. g., Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, 
Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016). We expected the spatial distance of any of the nine tested 
characteristics before towards the characteristic likability to predict the size of the valence effect 
on that characteristic. 
 
3.4.1 Method. 
 Participants and design. 79 students (59 female, 20 male) of the University of Tübingen, 
Germany, participated in this study. The mean age was 22.59 years (SD = 4.43, ranging from 18 
to 48 years). They were either compensated with monetary payments (4.00 Euro) or course 
credit. The design was a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 10 (type of characteristics) within-
subjects design, with the spatial distances between the different characteristics as an additional 
measure.  
Materials and procedure. The same procedure and materials were used as in experiment 2a. 
After completing the EC procedure, participants were introduced to SpAM (Hout et al., 2013). In 
this, participants were shown all ten characteristics (in German language) in a random order on a 
computer screen and were asked to sort these characteristics by their similarity in a 
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multidimensional space (see Figure 3). The sorting was done by simply clicking the mouse 
button and moving it to the desired space. The similarity of characteristics is represented by the 
Euclidean distance of any two characteristics. In this case, all Euclidean distances from any of 
the nine remaining characteristics towards likability were measured. 
 
 
Figure 3. Possible starting and end screens of the SpAM-Method (Hout et al., 2013) in English language. 
Translation: Full of energy = Voller Energie, Intelligence = Intelligenz, Likability = Sympathie, Sincerity = 
Aufrichtigkeit, Respectability = Respekt, Competency = Kompetenz, Honesty = Ehrlichkeit , Fainess = Fair, 
Efficiency = Effizienz. 
 
3.4.2 Results. 
 Experiment 2d replicated the patterns found previously, as can be seen in Table 3. US 
valence was a significant predictor for all ten testes attributes.   
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Table 3 
Results of Experiment 2d 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and type of characteristics on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Agency and communion. US valence was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = 4.15, 
se = 0.33, t = 12.75, p < .001, indicating that CSs paired with positive USs were rated more 
positively across all evaluative ratings than CSs paired with negative USs. Type of characteristics 
was a significant predictor for CS overall ratings, b = -1.45, se = 0.33, t = -4.45, p < .001, 
indicating that CSs received higher scores on Agency related characteristics than on Communion 
related characteristics. These main effects were, once again, qualified by an interaction of US 
valence and type of characteristics, b = 1.23, se = 0.33, t = 3.77, p < .001, indicating that the 
effect of US valence was stronger for communion related characteristics than for agency related 
characteristics.  
Spatial distances. The mean Euclidean distance from all agency-related characteristics combined 
towards likability was 465 pixels, the mean Euclidean distance from all communion related 
characteristics (minus likability) combined towards likability was 311 pixels, on a group level 
(see Table 4). In the reported multilevel model analysis, the relationship of the spatial distance of 
any tested perceived characteristic and the valence effect on that perceived characteristic was 
 b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 3.28 0.53 6.25 < .001 
Efficiency 2.61 0.51 5.17 < .001 
Full of energy 3.01 0.58 5.23 < .001 
Intelligence 2.82 0.49 5.78 < .001 
Respectability 2.80 0.53 5.31 <. 001 
     
Communion     
Fairness 5.38 0.58 9.30 < .001 
Honesty 5.45 0.57 9.57 < .001 
Likability 5.45 0.63 8.86 < .001 
Loyalty 5.47 0.58 9.52 < .001 
Sincerity 5.18 0.56 9.25 < .001 
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tested on a trial-by-trial basis. Spatial distance to likability was a significant predictor for the US 
valence effect on any tested characteristic, b = -0.003, se = 0.001, t = -2.10, p < .05. 
 
Table 4 
Spatial Distances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Distance = Euclidean distance from any given attribute towards likability in pixels. All values represent mean 
values on a group level. 
 
3.4.3 Discussion. 
The last experiment supported the hypothesis that valence acts as superordinate 
dimension in impression formation. It was hypothesized that likability is the one characteristic 
that is closest to the latent construct valence, and because of this the spatial distance of any given 
characteristic towards likability should predict the size of the effect valence has on that 
characteristic. This was true for all nine characteristics that were tested. These results directly 
explain why communal characteristics were more influenced by valence than agentic 
characteristics, a pattern that was replicated in this final experiment, as well, because communal 
characteristics are conceptually more similar to likability than agentic characteristics.  
The results of experiment 2d also sum up the patterns observed in experiments 2a - 2d. 
First, acts as superordinate dimension in impression formation. Second, this superordinate 
dimension should influence all subordinate dimensions, which were defined as all dimensions 
that can be described as either positive or negative. Third, valence influences communal 
characteristics more strongly than agentic characteristics and fourth, this effect can be explained 
by the conceptual similarity (measured as spatial distances) of any given characteristic towards 
Agency Distance Communion Distance 
Competency 468 Fairness 283 
Efficiency 547 Honesty 354 
Full of energy 480 Loyalty 315 
Intelligence 493 Sincerity 290 
Respectability  305   
    
Mean  465 Mean  310 
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likability. These findings allow for precise predictions of valence effects in impression formation 
that go beyond the tested characteristics in this investigation. 
 
4. General Discussion 
The current investigation demonstrated that valence plays a big role in impression 
formation. EC has been used to isolate and manipulate valence directly. The first set of 
experiments showed that EC is a reasonable procedure investigate valence effects in impression 
formation. That is because the acquired valence did not only affect the specific stimulus used in 
the conditioning phase, but transferred over to altered versions, an essential prerequisite for the 
explanatory power of EC on real world valence effects. The process behind this transfer remains 
unclear. It was hypothesized that in EC procedures, not only the specific stimulus acquires 
valence (e.g., the picture of a person) but the whole cognitive concept (e.g., the pictured person 
itself). The data showed a mixed pattern on this issue, mirroring the mixed findings on 
underlying cognitive processes of EC procedures in general (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010)  
The second set of experiments supported the valence illusion hypothesis, which states that 
valence acts as a superordinate dimension that influences subordinate dimensions. It has been 
shown that valence affects characteristics beyond likability, the standard measure of EC effects. 
Valence did influence characteristics that belong to communion more strongly than 
characteristics that belong to agency. This difference in size of the valence effect can be 
predicted by the spatial distance of the given characteristic towards likability. 
 
4.1  Putting the valence illusion into context  
In the literature of impression formation, other spread over effects have been 
documented. The most similar effect to the valence illusion is the halo effect, which describes a 
tendency of judges to assume that once a person possesses some known good (or bad) 
characteristics, their other, unrelated and unknown characteristics are likely to be consistent with 
the good (or bad) known characteristic (Forgas & Laham, 2017). Consistent with this definition, 
past research on halo effects has focused on presenting a given characteristic and the spread over 
of this characteristic then was labeled a halo effect. Hence, the halo effect needs a given 
characteristic as a starting point, like beauty in the what-is-beautiful-is-good-effect (Dion et al., 
1972). The present research took a more process-oriented route. By manipulating valence 
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directly, there was not a single characteristic of a person that served as a starting point. Valence 
then caused a cognitive bias similar to the halo effect.  
The main difference of the halo effect and the valence illusion lies in the causal chain: 
halo effects start with a known characteristic and affect other characteristics, the valence illusion 
starts without a known characteristic, but with a positive (or negative) event.  While the source of 
the spread over effect in halo effects lies at least to some degree in the person (i.e., it is the 
person itself that is beautiful), the source of the valence associated with the person in the valence 
illusion effect does not need to lie in the person. The mere co-occurrence (in space and time) of a 
positive (or negative) event and the person to be judged is enough to cause a cognitive bias that 
affects our judgments in impression formation. 
The cause of these judgments lies in the associated valence, and not in accurate 
observations of the abilities of the target, therefore, I argue that the results of my experiments 
demonstrate a form of Cognitive Illusions. According to Pohl (2017), a Cognitive Illusion leads 
(1) to a perception or judgment that reliably deviates from an objective reality, and (2) this 
deviation has to be in a systematic fashion. They appear (3) involuntarily and are (4) hard to 
avoid and (5) stick out from the normal course of information processing.  
Even though the true characteristics of the portrayed persons are unknown, and thus it is 
hard to argue that the judgments differ from the objective truth, I will still argue that they do. 
Because there is a systematic difference between the judgments for the very same portrayed 
person in dependence of the associated valence with that portrait person, the judgments have to 
derivate from the truth. When the same person gets two systematically different judgments, at 
least one judgment must differ from the truth.  
But did the judgments appeared involuntarily and are hard to avoid? My data do not 
allow to answer this question directly. Past research on both, Evaluative Conditioning and halo 
effects have shown, however, that both effects can occur without participants deliberate will 
(Balas & Gawronski, 2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Because my experiments could be seen as 
a mixture of Evaluative Conditioning effects (valence effects) and halo effects (spread over 
effects), there is good reason to assume that the same is true for the valence illusion, even though 
this should be tested directly in future research.  
For the last point, I argue that the found pattern does stick out from the normal course of 
information processing, because who would have thought that pairing a portrait of a person with 
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a picture of a nice sunset would result in people believing that the portrait person is more 
intelligent? In a normal pattern of information processing, I would assume that people rely on 
observations of the to be judged ability itself, not on unrelated positive or negative events outside 
of the target person. 
 
4.2  The role of correct recognitions 
Is correct recognition a necessity for the found valence effects in impression formation? 
The data analyzed in this dissertation suggest that this is not the case. In two experiments, the 
correct recognition did not moderate the effect of US valence, and in the third experiment, it only 
did so marginally. For Experiment 1a, one could argue that the measure we used was not optimal, 
since almost all stimuli were recalled correctly, leaving too few data points in the non-recognized 
stimuli cell. This argument, however, was targeted directly by Experiment 1b, in which we 
doubled the amount of stimuli, resulting in more cases of not correctly identified stimuli. Still, 
the correct recognition did not moderate the EC effect. Taken together, these results suggest that 
participants did not need to identify the correct stimuli. While contingency awareness was 
identified as the most important moderator of EC effects in a meta-analysis, contingency 
unaware EC effects do occur (e. g., Hofmann et al., 2010). Even though we did not test 
participant’s recognition of CS – US pairings (we only tested whether the portrayed person has 
been seen before), the results of our experiment do seem to point in the same direction.  
 
4.3 Implications 
The reported experiments opened the door for EC procedures to be used as an 
investigative tool for valence effects in impression formation. While most research on EC is 
devoted to questions about the underlying cognitive processes, this line of research offers new 
ways for both, EC researchers and researchers on impression formation, to explore.  
The here demonstrated valence illusion has far reaching implications. It demonstrates that 
valence leads to a bias in judgments about others, and this bias may come into play whenever 
people need to be judged on different dimensions. Often people have to be selected for certain 
tasks, and this selection is often based on judgments about perceived personal characteristics of 
the target person. You might want to hire intelligent people if the job-vacancy that is to be filled 
is cognitive demanding. The valence illusion suggest that we are biased in the way we perceive 
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the intelligence of a person, depending on the valence we associate with him or here. If you 
believe that your co-workers are more honest than workers at a different lab, than you might fall 
victim to the valence illusion, because you (hopefully) had some positive experiences with you 
co-workers, which biased the way you think about them. The interesting thing here is that past 
EC research suggests that the positive (or negative) experience with one person does not have to 
be of a causal nature. The mere co-occurrence in space and time of a valenced event with one 
person might be enough to trick us into the valence illusion. 
 
4.4 Future research 
Future research should focus on distinguishing the valence illusion from other spread 
over effects. As shown earlier, many halo effects seem to share the same valent direction, hence 
it would be interesting to test whether these halo effects really need a known starting point, like 
the beauty of a person in the what-is-beautiful-is-good effect. Because looking at beautiful 
persons is likely to be associated with positive valence, future research could test whether these 
effects really start with the given attribute, in this case beauty.  It seems possible that beauty 
effects have its root in the valence associated with it, and the current work offers a direct way to 
test these possibilities. Future research should also further investigate the similarities of other 
attributes and likability. This way, the prediction of the size of the valence illusion could be more 
specific and extended to other areas.  
One important avenue of future research lies in question on how to deal with the valence 
illusion. The valence illusion shows how inaccurate people are in judging others, yet when 
evaluating other persons, accuracy is very important. Researchers need to identify possible ways 
to deflect such a bias. Because both, EC effects and halo effects have been shown to be 
independent of participants being aware of the bias, people are likely to fall victim to these 
effects every day.  
Boundaries of the valence illusion should be addressed. The first set of experiments 
showed that it is still unclear to what degree a stimulus can be changed and still be affected by 
the valence transfer, even though this question is very important for given answers on how far 
these effects go. What is the boundary distant for the similarity ratings towards likability? How 
distant can an attribute be to still be target of the valence illusion? Are their dimensions that 
produce even bigger effects then likability? Would that mean that there is a dimension even 
48 
 
closer to valence itself? And would this dimension then be a better predictor for the size of the 
valence effect? 
 
4.5 Limitations 
Even though the valence illusion has been documented with a total of seven Experiments, 
there are still limitations worth to be mentioned.  
First, even though the valence illusion hypothesis claims to be caused by valence, it has 
only been tested with EC procedures. Thus, even though unlikely, it is still a possibility that the 
found effects are unique in EC settings. One way to eliminate this limitation would be to use 
alternative methods of inducing valence effects, such as the mere exposure procedure.  
Second, likability has been used as the dimension that comes closest to the latent 
construct valence. This has been derived from the literature of EC, in which likability is the 
standard measure of valence effects. Still, there is only indirect experimental evidence for such a 
claim. Thus, it might be possible that other dimensions are even closer to valence, and the 
valence illusion would then predict that these other dimensions would be a better predictor for 
the size of the valence effects.  
Lastly, the valence illusion hypothesis claims to demonstrate a cognitive bias in everyday 
situations, but all experiments were taken in isolated labor settings. This was done for good 
reason, because labor settings allow the researcher to have full control over what is happing, and 
thus help to eliminate disturbing influences and alternative explanations. Still, whenever research 
claims to explain real world phenomena, the real test would come in real world settings. In the 
laboratory, valence and portrait photographs were the only pieces of information that participants 
got to form an impression. In the real world, people will have access to many more information 
about a person, accurate and inaccurate. Thus, it is unclear how resistant these valence effects are 
when competing with other pieces of information. This is, however, not a unique limitation of the 
valence illusion hypothesis, but applies to all research that has only been documented in 
laboratory settings.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The present dissertation argues that valence acts as a superordinate dimension in 
impression formation. This assumption was tested via EC, a procedure that has been said to 
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manipulate isolated valence directly. First, it has been demonstrated that EC is a suitable 
procedure for the investigation of valence effects in impression formation, because it was shown 
that the valence effects caused by the EC procedure did not only affect the specific photograph 
that had been used in the conditioning phase. Valence transfer did happen even for those CSs that 
were altered by possible everyday changes in appearance of human beings, such as the addition 
or subtraction of glasses. Furthermore, valence did act as a superordinate dimension, influencing 
both, agentic and communal related characteristics. The size of this effect can be predicted by the 
conceptual similarity of the given characteristic with likability, which were measured by 
distances in a multidimensional space. This influence of valence on subordinate dimensions in 
impression formation has been labeled the valence illusion, because valence biased the 
judgments on perceived characteristics of photographed individuals. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1 
Results of Experiment 1a 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence, Viewing Angle Change (VAC), and Recognition Ratings (RR) on a trial by trial 
basis. 
 
Table 2 
Results of Experiment 1b 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence, Viewing Angle Change (VAC), and Recognition Ratings (RR) on a trial by trial 
basis. 
  
 b se t p 
US Valence 4.73 1.11 4.27 < .001 
VAC 45° -0.35 1.56 -0.23 .82 
VAC 90° 2.96 1.57 1.89 .06 
RR -1.14 1.62 -0.71 .48 
Valence × VAC 45° -1.26 1.58 -0.80 .43 
Valence × VAC 90° -1.72 1.57 -1.09 .27 
Valence × RR 0.93 1.45 0.64 .52 
VAC 45° × RR 2.12 1.91 1.11 .27 
VAC 90° × RR 2.38 1.75 1.37 .17 
Valence × VAC 45° × RR 1.61 1.89 0.85 .40 
Valence × VAC 90° × RR 0.32 1.72 0.18 .85 
 b se t p 
US Valence 1.46 0.76 1.91 .06 
VAC 45° 1.80 1.08 1.66 .10 
VAC 90° -0.47 1.07 -0.43 .66 
RR 2.44 0.88 2.79 < .01 
Valence × VAC 45° 0.36 1.08 0.33 .74 
Valence × VAC 90° -0.47 1.07 -0.44 .66 
Valence × RR 0.34 0.85 0.40 .69 
VAC 45° × RR -1.33 1.11 -1.19 .23 
VAC 90° × RR -1.86 1.15 -1.62 .11 
Valence × VAC 45° × RR -0.44 1.11 -0.40 .69 
Valence × VAC 90° × RR -0.21 1.14 -0.18 .85 
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Table 3 
Results of Experiment 1c 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence, CS Feature Change (CS FC), and Recognition Ratings (RR) on a trial by trial 
basis. 
 
Table 4 
Results of Experiment 2a: Attributes 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and Attributes on a trial by trial basis. 
  
 b se t p 
US Valence 3.15 0.97 3.25 < .01 
CS FC 0.07 0.68 0.11 .91 
RR -0.79 0.76 -1.04 .30 
Valence × CS FC 0.36 0.97 -0.38 .71 
Valence × RR -1.75 1.03 -1.70 .09 
CS FC × RR  0.28 0.73 0.38 .70 
Valence × CS FC × RR -0.84 1.02 -0.82 .41 
Attribute b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 4.95 0.82 6.06 < .001 
Efficiency 2.05 0.76 2.72 < .01 
Full of energy 4.48 0.86 5.22 < .001 
Intelligence 2.39 0.71 3.37 < .001 
Respectability 3.74 0.83 4.50 <. 001 
     
Communion     
Fairness 6.74 0.81 8.30 < .001 
Honesty 7.16 0.87 8.27 < .001 
Likability 6.76 0.90 7.48 < .001 
Loyalty 6.87 0.87 7.89 < .001 
Sincerity 6.56 0.82 7.99 < .001 
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Table 5 
Results of Experiment 2a: Grand Analysis 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence and Type of Characteristics (ToC) on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Table 6 
Results of Experiment 2b: Attributes 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and Attributes on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Table 7 
Results of Experiment 2b: Grand Analysis 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence and Type of Characteristics (ToC) on a trial by trial basis. 
  
Attribute b se t p 
US Valence 3.53 0.69 5.12 < .001 
ToC -3.40 0.98 -3.48 < .001 
US Valence × ToC 3.25 0.98 3.33 < .001 
Attribute b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 2.28 0.70 3.27 < .01 
Efficiency 1.84 0.67 2.74 < .01 
Full of energy 1.41 0.80 1.75 .08 
Intelligence 1.87 0.65 2.87 < .01 
Respectability 2.21 0.70 3.15 <. 01 
     
Communion     
Fairness 3.24 0.75 4.33 < .001 
Honesty 2.63 0.77 3.41 < .001 
Likability 1.77 0.83 2.12 < .05 
Loyalty 1.05 0.78 1.35 .18 
Sincerity 1.75 0.76 2.29 < .05 
Attribute b se t p 
US Valence 1.99 0.61 3.28 < .01 
ToC -3.03 0.86 -3.25 < .001 
US Valence × ToC 0.02 0.86 0.03 .98 
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Table 8 
Results of Experiment 2c: Attributes 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and Attributes on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Table 9 
Results of Experiment 2c: Grand Analysis 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence, Type of Characteristics (ToC), and US Material on a trial by trial basis. 
  
Attribute b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 2.46 2.70 3.58 < .01 
Efficiency 1.44 0.51 2.84 < .01 
Full of energy 2.15 0.56 3.84 < .001 
Intelligence 1.36 0.50 2.70 < .01 
Respectability 2.69 0.53 5.06 <. 001 
     
Communion     
Fairness 4.66 0.59 7.86 < .001 
Honesty 4.15 0.59 7.03 < .001 
Likability 4.10 0.59 6.89 < .001 
Loyalty 3.72 0.59 6.32 < .001 
Sincerity 4.98 0.58 8.53 < .001 
Attribute b se t p 
US Valence 3.18 0.33 9.68 < .001 
ToC -1.43 0.33 -4.35 < .001 
US Material 0.52 0.73 0.72 .47 
US Valence × ToC 1.16 0.33 3.54 < .001 
US Valence × US Material  -0.60 0.33 1.82 .07 
ToC × US Material 0.66 0.33 2.02 < .05 
US Valence × ToC × US 
Material 
-0.45 0.33 -1.36 .17 
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Table 10 
Results of Experiment 2d: Attributes 
 
Note: Relationships of US valence and Attributes on a trial by trial basis. 
 
Table 11 
Results of Experiment 2d: Grand Analysis 
 
Note: Relationships of US Valence and Type of Characteristics (ToC) on a trial by trial basis. 
  
Attribute b se t p 
Agency     
Competency 3.28 0.53 6.25 < .001 
Efficiency 2.61 0.51 5.17 < .001 
Full of energy 3.01 0.58 5.23 < .001 
Intelligence 2.82 0.49 5.78 < .001 
Respectability 2.80 0.53 5.31 <. 001 
     
Communion     
Fairness 5.38 0.58 9.30 < .001 
Honesty 5.45 0.57 9.57 < .001 
Likability 5.45 0.63 8.86 < .001 
Loyalty 5.47 0.58 9.52 < .001 
Sincerity 5.18 0.56 9.25 < .001 
Attribute b se t p 
US Valence 2.92 0.46 6.35 < .001 
ToC -2.89 0.65 -4.45 < .001 
US Valence × ToC 2.45 0.65 3.77 < .001 
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Table 12 
Spatial Distances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Distance = Euclidean distance from any given attribute towards likability in pixels. All values represent mean 
values on a group level. 
  
Agency Distance Communion Distance 
Competency 468 Fairness 283 
Efficiency 547 Honesty 354 
Full of energy 480 Loyalty 315 
Intelligence 493 Sincerity 290 
Respectability  305   
    
Mean  465 Mean  310 
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Appendix B  
Items Experiments 1a – 1c 
Scale ranging from 0 (sehr unangenehm) to 100 (sehr angenehm) 
Bitte geben Sie für jede Person an, wie angenehm oder unangenehm Sie die abgebildete Person 
finden! Uns interessiert Ihr spontaner Eindruck. 
 
Scale: Yes or No 
Haben Sie diese Person in der vorangegangenen Wahrnehmungsphase gesehen?  
 
Items Experiments 2a – 2d 
Scale ranging from -50 to 50  
Die abgebildete Person ist kompetent 
Die abgebildete Person ist effizient 
Die abgebildete Person ist voller Energie 
Die abgebildete Person ist intelligent 
Ich habe vor der abgebildeten Person Respekt 
Die abgebildete Person ist fair anderen gegenüber 
Die abgebildete Person ist ehrlich 
Die abgebildete Person ist loyal 
Die abgebildete Person ist aufrichtig 
Ich mag die abgebildete Person 
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Appendix C 
All statistical analyses were performed with RStudio (1.0.153). All linear models were analyzed 
using the lmer() function from lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Boker, 2011). The following 
commands were used to fit the initial models: 
 
> library (lme4) 
> model_1 < lmer(y ~ c + (1 | j) + (c | i), data =dat) 
 
